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The Pace of Change: Non-practicing Entities 
and the Shifting Legal Landscape 
By Robin Feldman* 
In ordinary circumstances, legal doctrines evolve at a glacial 
pace. As I have discussed in prior work, law is constantly driven 
to adapt to changing circumstances within existing frameworks, 
as tested and refined through various spheres of acceptance.1 
This is not, however, a speedy process, and it can take years or 
even decades for issues on the ground to bubble up to the level of 
an administrative agency, let alone the Supreme Court or 
Congress. 
Patent law is somewhat of an exception.2 The compressed 
time frame of twenty years—after which the patent expires—
encourages patent holders to identify and move quickly on issues 
related to the boundaries of those rights. In addition, the pace of 
science itself is rapid, which means that patents are constantly 
interpreted and applied in an environment of rapidly changing 
meaning and context. These factors can drive patent law to 
evolve more rapidly than many areas of law. 
Nevertheless, even for the field of patent law, the pace of 
change in recent years has been astounding. One can see this on 
numerous levels—from public awareness, to scholarship, to court 
decisions, to legislative and regulatory decisions at the state and 
federal level. Much of this focus is attributable to non-practicing 
entities. Known by various names, including “monetizers,” 
“patent assertion entities,” “NPEs,” and the more colorful 
appellation of “patent trolls,” non-practicing entities have 
exploded onto the scene in the last five to seven years, altering 
business models across numerous sectors. 
This piece will explore the impact that non-practicing 
entities are having on the business and legal landscape in this 
 
 * Harry & Lillian Hastings Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for 
Innovation Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to 
Dean Tom Campbell for his kind invitation to participate in this symposium and to Hadas 
Livnat, UC Hastings public service librarian, for her research assistance. 
 1 ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 94 (2009) (describing the 
mismatch of law and science). 
 2 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 27–29 (2012) (comparing patent 
law to other legal regimes). 
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country. The first part of the piece will explore what we know 
about non-practicing entities, and what we do not know. The 
second part will describe recent shifts in common law doctrines, 
as well as regulatory and legislative actions. The last part will 
consider the road ahead. 
I. NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES 
A considerable amount of ink has been spilled on how one 
should define a non-practicing entity (“NPE”). With much money 
at stake, numerous entities have an incentive to craft the 
definition in a way that omits their own business model, a 
process that has resulted in intense lobbying not only of 
governmental officials, but also of academics. Throughout my 
work, I try to use an uncomplicated definition: non-practicing 
entities are those whose core business activity involves licensing 
and litigating patents, rather than making products. This 
definition includes everyone with that business model, regardless 
of whether they are organized as a partnership, a trust, or in any 
other manner.3 
Monetization activity and non-practicing entities have 
existed in the patent world across time. In recent years, however, 
new types of business entities have emerged that are far more 
sophisticated and extensive than what has been seen in the past. 
For example, in a little over five years, the largest non-practicing 
entity accumulated between 30,000 and 60,000 patent assets, 
giving it the fifth largest patent portfolio of any domestic 
U.S. company and the fifteenth largest of any company in the 
world.4 
Whether by accident or by design, the business model of 
non-practicing entities has the potential to be quite lucrative, 
regardless of the merit of any underlying patent claims. Taking a 
simple patent lawsuit to trial costs between $1 million and 
$6 million.5 Faced with such costs, a rational product company 
 
 3 For an extensive discussion of the different definitions used and the implications 
of each, see Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the 
Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236 (2014). Data for the study came 
from the Lex Machina database, which extracts information from public databases 
including the U.S. District Court websites and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
website. The Lex Machina database is available to academics free of charge. In addition, 
in deciding whether a plaintiff was an operating company or a non-practicing entity, the 
study used only publicly available data. 
 4 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, ¶ 1. 
 5 Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence 
in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1584 (2009); AM. 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2011 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2011). For 
smaller cases where the amount in controversy is under $1 million, the average trial itself 
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may choose to buy a license, regardless of whether the patent is 
valid or in any way infringed by a company’s products. The 
problem is magnified for non-practicing entities with large 
portfolios. If a non-practicing entity asserts a large number of 
patents, the cost of investigating the validity of the claims may 
be greater than the cost of simply taking a license. 
When a company that makes a product asserts its patents 
against another product company, the targeted company can 
threaten to retaliate by asserting its own patents against the 
first company’s products. This mutually assured destruction can 
act as a brake on the behavior of product companies. 
Non-practicing entities, however, do not make any products and 
thus are not vulnerable to the disciplining effect. In addition, 
non-practicing entities are frequently structured as shell 
companies, in which money is distributed to other entities. Thus, 
even if a targeted company were to receive a judgment for 
attorney’s fees or sham litigation damages—an unlikely event 
under current law—the non-practicing entity could have no 
available assets to pay the judgment. This business model 
creates pressure for product companies to buy a license, 
irrespective of the merits of the claim. 
The impact of non-practicing entities, and the pace at which 
those entities have come to dominate the patent landscape, can 
be seen in recent studies of patent litigation. The following 
information comes from an extensive academic study examining 
all 13,000 patent lawsuits filed over four recent years.6 In 2007, 
non-practicing entities filed only 25% of the patent lawsuits. That 
percentage rose sharply in 2008, and by 2012, non-practicing 
entities were filing a majority of the patent lawsuits in the 
United States.7 In addition, of the top ten most frequent filers of 
patent litigation, all ten were non-practicing entities.8 
The impact of NPEs on patent litigation can be seen in terms 
of defendants sued, as well as cases filed. The number of 
defendants sued actually drops after passage of the America 
Invents Act, but those numbers are still far above where we were 
in 2007.9 
 
costs almost a million dollars. Chien, supra, at 1592–93. For larger cases where the 
amount in controversy is greater than $25 million, the average trial costs almost $6 
million. Id. at 1584.  
 6 See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The 
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 2013, at 1, 6. 
 7 Id. at 7. 
 8 Id. at 58. 
 9 Id. at 43–57. 
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In particular, the America Invents Act, which became law in 
September of 2011, changed patent lawsuit rules known as 
joinder rules. The changes were intended to make it more 
difficult to include many defendants in the same lawsuit. As a 
result, if you want to sue a number of defendants after passage of 
the America Invents Act, you have to file more lawsuits. For 
academics looking at the data, it means one cannot simply count 
lawsuits. A rise in lawsuits could simply mean that people are 
engaging in the same amount of activity—they are just suing the 
same number of people spread out across more lawsuits. Thus, 
one must also look at the number of defendants sued. Looking at 
the number of defendants sued confirmed a substantial increase 
in litigation activity across the six-year period from the earliest 
year of the study to the latest year.10 
Although the number of defendants sued rises substantially 
across time, the number of defendants sued by non-practicing 
entities decreased from 2011 to 2012. To consider this further, 
the study looked month-by-month, and the results were 
fascinating. There was a huge spike in the total number of 
defendants sued by non-practicing entities in the month before 
the America Invents Act was signed into law.11 In other words, 
non-practicing entities rushed to the courthouse to get their 
lawsuits filed the month before the act was signed. In fact, the 
increase was so high that we had to adjust the scale on the slide 
just to get the picture onto a single image. Product companies 
also increased the number of defendants sued that month by a 
slight amount, but nothing compared to the sky-high levels at 
which non-practicing entities increased their litigation activity.12 
The number of defendants sued by non-practicing entities 
the month after passage of the America Invents Act returned to 
where it had been before the spike, until about six months later, 
when the number of defendants sued began to rise again. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that non-practicing entities were 
able to find a workaround to avoid the changes in the America 
Invents Act. The critical point, however, is the following: despite 
the reduction in defendants sued after passage of the America 
Invents Act, the number of defendants sued—even in the lower 
period—remains well above the earlier years. Thus, despite some 
impact from the America Invents Act, the train still appears to be 
barreling down the tracks.13 
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 49. 
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There have been a number of other studies of non-practicing 
entities in U.S. litigation. These include studies by: the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”); Cotropia, Kesan, and 
Schwartz; Chien; and by nonprofits and private groups.14 The 
results among these studies are remarkably consistent. What 
varies is the way in which the authors slice the data. The GAO 
study is a good example. I am intimately familiar with the GAO 
data because I was one of three scholars who collected and coded 
the data for the GAO.15 The GAO used a sample of 500 cases 
from 2007 to 2011 and looked at the number of lawsuits, not the 
number of defendants. Its report shows a smaller increase in the 
number of lawsuits filed by non-practicing entities across the 
relevant periods than other studies do. Much of the difference 
occurs because the GAO looked only at what it defined as 
“entities,” which it defined to include only corporations or 
partnerships. The GAO did not include anyone organized as a 
trust or operating as an individual; adding in trusts and 
individuals makes its results similar to everyone else’s.16 
By removing individuals and trusts, however, the GAO 
figures missed important activity. For example, in the GAO’s own 
sample of 500 lawsuits, the party filing the greatest number of 
lawsuits turned out to be a trust—one whose business activity is 
licensing and litigating patents, and one that is well-known in 
the patent arena.17 Thus, the number one non-practicing entity 
 
 14 See, e.g., Christopher Anthony Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, 
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=2346381; Colleen V. Chien, Assistant 
Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Presentation at 2012 FTC/DOJ Workshop on 
PAEs at Santa Clara University: Patent Assertion Entities (Dec. 10, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2187314; All About NPEs, PAT. FREEDOM, https://www. 
patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations (last updated July 14, 2014); 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE 
HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE (2013), available at http://www.pwc.com/ 
en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 15 Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 
500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
357 (2012) (Lex Machina co-authors Sara Jeruss and Joshua Walker were joined by 
Professor Robin Feldman of UC Hastings, College of the Law to code the five hundred 
cases in order to establish the types of entities involved in each of the lawsuits and to 
examine additional details of the suits. The GAO requested only the coded data without 
analysis, and the authors provided this with the understanding that they would publish 
their own analysis separate from the GAO report.). 
 16 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD 
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 17 n.35 (2013) (noting the exclusion of individuals and 
trusts and the resulting variation from the expanded analysis in supra note 6); Feldman, 
supra note 3, at 245–50 (describing confusions resulting from the GAO’s definition of 
“entity”). 
 17 Feldman, supra note 3, at 245. 
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was left out of the GAO conclusions simply because it was 
organized as a trust. 
Despite issues such as these, the litigation data itself is 
remarkably consistent across researchers. By all accounts, 
however, litigation is “only the tip of the iceberg.”18 Most patent 
demands never result in a lawsuit, and some estimates suggest 
that only ten percent of patent demands proceed all the way to 
filing a lawsuit. 19  Patent demands outside of a lawsuit are 
potentially the most troubling interactions because they happen 
outside the purview of the sovereign, without the disciplining 
effects of judges and legal procedures. 
Good, objective research into patent demands outside 
lawsuits is excruciatingly difficulty to accomplish. These 
interactions are shrouded in non-disclosure agreements, ones 
that reportedly reach well beyond protecting intellectual property 
or confidential business information. I often shake my head at 
those who impose aggressive non-disclosure agreements and then 
argue vociferously that the government must not act because it 
has no data. 
There are, however, a limited number of small studies on 
patent demands outside lawsuits. These studies frequently use 
survey data, including several surveys related to patent demands 
and startup companies. 20  For example, in Patent Demands 
& Startup Companies: The View from the Venture Capital 
Community,21 I examined responses from roughly 220 venture 
capitalists and their portfolio companies. Key results include that 
70% of the venture capitalists have portfolio companies that have 
received patent demands, with those demands increasing over 
the last five years.22 Of those that have received patent demands, 
70% have experienced demands in the information technology 
sector and 30% have experienced demands in the life sciences.23 
Most patent demands against startup companies are coming 
from non-practicing entities, and demands are having a 
significant financial and human impact on the startups.  
 
 18 Id. at 30. 
 19 Id.  
 20 See generally, e.g., supra note 3; Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 1 
(Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-12, 2012) [hereinafter Startups 
and Patent Trolls], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2146251; Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion & Startup Innovation (Sept. 5, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2321340.  
 21 See Feldman, supra note 3. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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Other interesting data focus on where the money is going 
and where it is coming from. Economic data also is difficult to 
come by, but the available information is sobering. In what 
economists are calling the “leaky bucket,” very little of the money 
paid to non-practicing entities flows back to inventors or 
innovation. 24  Only an estimated 20% of the payments to 
non-practicing entities gets back to the original inventors or into 
any internal research and development.25  
In terms of who is paying, the majority of non-practicing 
entity lawsuits are filed against small businesses. I am not 
talking about the recent rise of patent demands against 
mom-and-pop stores. Even before this phenomenon, there has 
been data showing that the majority of non-practicing entity 
lawsuits are filed against small businesses with revenues under 
$10 million.26 
Despite these important forays, data on patent demands 
outside of litigation remain critically important and difficult to 
come by. It is certainly not an easy task to get 220 busy venture 
capitalists and startup folks to respond, but it is nothing like 
being able to look at public data on 13,000 lawsuits filed. 
Managing that difficulty is the challenge ahead for academic 
researchers. 
Not all of the assertions about non-practicing entities have 
held up to scrutiny. This is true regardless of whether those 
assertions were advanced in support of patent reform or in 
opposition to patent reform. For example, stories have circulated 
that non-practicing entities particularly target companies at 
funding events, such as when a company receives its first round 
of venture capital fundraising. My survey of venture capitalists 
and their companies did not find evidence that such a practice is 
widespread.27 
On the flip side, a narrative had circulated suggesting that 
the NPE business model spurs venture capital investment. 
According to that theory, venture capitalists will be attracted to 
the possibility that a startup company’s patents can be monetized 
if the company fails, and this attraction spurs investment.28 The 
results of the startup company survey soundly refuted that 
 
 24 See James Bessen & Michael Meurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 
99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014); Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent 
Acquisitions (July 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ss 
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2288911. 
 25 Bessen & Meurer supra note 24, at 411.  
 26 Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 27 See Feldman, supra note 3. 
 28 Id. at 240 & n.13 (citing a speech by a federal regulatory official). 
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assertion. The majority of venture capitalists who responded do 
not consider the potential for selling patents to NPEs when they 
decide whether to invest in a company. If it does not matter to 
them, it cannot be attracting capital. As one venture capitalist 
commented, “VCs swing for the fences; they are not interested in 
pennies on the dollar.”29 
Moreover, venture capitalists and startups do not see patent 
assertion activity in general as good for the startup community. 
To paraphrase one venture capitalist, when companies are 
spending time and money responding to patent demands, they 
are not inventing and they are not hiring.30 
Testing various narratives and assertions such as these will 
be critical as the policy debates move forward. 
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM RESPONDS 
As the non-practicing entity business model has increased so 
dramatically in recent years, public attention has increasingly 
focused on the phenomenon. The legal system has responded on 
many different levels—both federal and state, as well as on the 
legislative, regulatory, and common law front. On the legislative 
front, the U.S. House of Representatives approved an extensive 
patent reform bill in the fall of 2013, aimed largely at litigation 
reform.31 The bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee, after 
extensive hearings and debate behind the scenes. Leadership of 
both the House and the Senate have indicated that patent reform 
will continue to be high on the agenda. 
On the regulatory front, the White House released a report 
on patent assertion, along with a series of executive orders.32 The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office instituted its own reforms in 
response to the executive orders, and the Federal Trade 
Commission initiated a rare section 6(b) investigation into the 
economic effects of non-practicing entities, focusing on 
twenty-five such entities.33 On the state level, a handful of state 
legislatures and attorneys general initiated legislative or 
 
 29 Id. at 280. 
 30 Feldman, supra note 3, at 243. 
 31 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (a bipartisan bill aimed at 
combating abusive patent litigation). 
 32 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 33 See FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their Impact on 
Innovation, Competition, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-imp 
act. 
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regulatory action against non-practicing entities that allegedly 
engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices.34 
Perhaps the largest immediate impact may be felt by 
Supreme Court decisions during the most recent term. The Court 
penned six patent decisions, the largest number in any single 
year since the specialized patent appeals court—the Federal 
Circuit—was created in 1982. In each opinion, the Justices 
soundly rejected the logic of the Federal Circuit. In case after 
case, the decisions cut back on the broad roaming range that 
patent holders have come to enjoy and expect from the Federal 
Circuit.35 The decisions included issues such as: making it easier 
to overturn a patent for indefiniteness;36 maintaining the burden 
on the patent holder to prove that a patent is valid in a 
declaratory judgment action;37 and making it slightly easier for 
trial courts to award fees to prevailing parties in “‘exceptional’ 
cases.”38 Taken together, these decisions will have the effect of 
reducing the bargaining power that non-practicing entities have 
wielded against companies against whom they are asserting 
patents. 
The most dramatic Supreme Court decision of last term, 
however, is the patentable subject matter decision of Alice v. CLS 
Bank.39  Alice concerned the question of whether and to what 
extent software and business method patents may be patentable. 
A favorite of non-practicing entities, these broadly worded 
patents have proven an effective weapon to wield against product 
companies. In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s logic, the Supreme 
 
 34 The Vermont state legislature passed a bill, Bad Faith Assertions of Patent 
Infringements, H. 299, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013), codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§§ 4195–4199 (2014). In addition, the Vermont Attorney General filed a complaint against 
MPHJ Technology, alleging that MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive practices when it 
sent letters threatening patent litigation to small businesses and non-profits in the state. 
Complaint at 1, State v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC (Vt. Super. Ct. 2014) (No. 282-5-13 
Wncv), 2014 WL 2178325. The Oregon Senate passed S. 1540, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 2014) (making patent trolling a violation of the state’s Unlawful Trade 
Practices Act). In Wisconsin, the legislature passed S. 498, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wis. 2014) (making it a crime to send patent-licensing demand letters that contain false 
or misleading information). In New York, the state Attorney General entered into a 
settlement with MPHJ. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., IN THE 
MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION BY ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK, OF MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS, LLC 9 (2014), available at 
http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/FINALAOD MPHJ.pdf (restricting the patent assertion activities 
within the state of New York). 
 35 See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27 
(2014) (describing in detail the Supreme Court’s six patent decisions in the 2013–2014 
term). 
 36 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2123 (2014). 
 37 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, L.L.C., 134 S. Ct. 843, 845 (2014). 
 38 See Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1751 
(2014); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1745 (2014). 
 39 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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Court established a test that will be difficult for many of the 
existing software and business method patents to meet.40 In fact, 
in the first four months after the Supreme Court’s decision, the 
lower courts rejected fifteen patents as failing to satisfy 
patentable subject matter under the Alice test.41  
The impact of the Alice decision will be heightened by new 
procedures for post-grant review of patents. As part of the 2011 
patent reform legislation, known as The America Invents Act, 
parties can now petition the Patent and Trademark Office to 
review the validity of patents that have been granted with 
procedures that were not previously available. Although complex 
and costly, these post-grant review opportunities will allow 
companies to challenge software and business method patents 
that were granted by the Patent and Trademark Office in the 
decades prior to Alice. 
In short, the outpouring of information and public attention 
has prompted activity at a variety of state and federal levels. 
Taken together, these common law, legislative, and regulatory 
actions represent a remarkably swift motion in the normally 
glacial legal landscape. 
III. WHAT LIES AHEAD 
As legislative and regulatory activity has increased, the 
rhetoric has heated up as well. Commentary has been advanced 
with a vehemence normally reserved for debates about topics 
such as abortion. It is a sign of the overheated nature of the 
commentary when the Supreme Court is attacked as “political” 
for its patent decisions and commentators are called “those who 
want to destroy the patent system.”42 Although I do not always 
agree with decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, for 
example, the Court’s patent rulings certainly are not subject to 
the lobbying donations that pour in during congressional 
deliberations. Nor do they evidence the type of ideological splits 
that could conceivably be termed political. In fact, all six of the 
Court’s patent decisions this term were unanimous. 
Nevertheless, I offer this as a simple example of the overheated 
rhetoric and fury that can easily disregard the genuine 
 
 40 See generally id. 
 41 Dan Liu & Glaser Weil, A Sea Change After ‘Alice’: Recent Court Decisions Show 
Patents Are Vulnerable Under Section 101 Attack, LAW.COM (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.law.com/sites/jdsupra/2014/10/30/a-sea-change-after-alice-recent-court-decisio 
ns-show-patents-are-vulnerable-under-section-101-attack/?slreturn=20150116141543. 
 42 Gene Quinn, Silicon Valley’s Anti-patent Propaganda: Success at What Cost?, IP 
WATCHDOG (Oct. 12, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/10/12/silicon-val 
leys-anti-patent-propaganda-success-at-what-cost/id=51643/. 
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challenges faced by the patent system in this period of intense 
change. 
The challenges are mammoth, indeed. The modern 
non-practicing entity business model has rapidly changed the 
patent landscape in a remarkably short period of time. As I have 
noted in comments to various government bodies, in theory, 
monetization could serve positive economic ends by providing 
market mechanisms so that those who patent ideas could connect 
with those who could translate the ideas into products. The ways 
in which patent monetization is playing out at the moment, 
however, are troubling. Opportunities for anti-competitive 
behavior are rampant and, for the most part, the system seems to 
operate primarily as a tax on current production, rather than as 
a mechanism for bringing forth new products. It is these 
perspectives that seem most troubling. 
The changes rendered in recent years—including post-grant 
review procedures, tighter requirements for patent validity, and 
increased possibility for fee awards in “exceptional cases”—all 
have the effect of shifting the bargaining leverage for those who 
receive patent demands. The changes do not, however, go to the 
heart of the problems that have emerged as the non-practicing 
entity business model has accelerated. In addition, the patent 
system remains a complex and byzantine affair—one that is 
primarily for the well-heeled and not for the faint of heart. Small 
players can easily be trampled, and little in either the current 
patent system or in the patent reforms will help such a problem.  
The pace of change in the patent landscape—not to mention 
the impact of those changes—is occurring at an extraordinary 
rate. The question is whether we can tone down the rhetoric and 
manage to do anything that has a lasting impact on the problems 
created. On that question, the jury is still out. 
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